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AN UPDATE ON: SELF-DETERMINATION
AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN A




This update focuses on two articles written by James A.R. Nafziger
for the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy. The initial arti-
cle is entitled Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a
Community of Power.' This article was later followed by Humanitarian
Intervention in a Community of Power: Part I.2
Generally, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention
looks at the principles of self-determination and humanitarian inter-
vention in the post-Cold War era. The author suggests that it would be
an appropriate time now for the international community to end the
debates surrounding these principles and move on to constructive dis-
cussions about methods of solving the disputes which continue to arise.3
Specifically, efforts should include greater preventive diplomacy, pre-
established procedures when disputes arise, and multilateral initiatives
by regional and international institutions.4 Nafziger argues that rely-
ing on regional and international institutions, rather than the unilat-
eral actions of individual states, may prevent the issues of self-
determination and humanitarian intervention from becoming threats to
international peace and security.5
The follow-up article, Humanitarian Intervention II, notes that the
* Pursuing J.D./M.A. at the University of Denver College of Law and the University
of Denver Graduate School of International Studies. The author would like to thank Pro-
fessor Ved P. Nanda for his guidance and Katie Coffey for her insight.
* J.D., University of Denver, College of Law, May 1997.
1. James A.R. Nafziger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a
Community of Power, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 9 (1991) [hereinafter Self-
Determination and Humanitarian Intervention].
2. James A.R. Nafziger, Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of Power-Part
II, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 219 (1994) [hereinafter Humanitarian Intervention II].
3. See Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 1, at 11.
4. Id. at 39.
5. Id,
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international community has embraced humanitarian intervention in
the past few years, but many key issues remain unresolved. 6 Nafziger
identifies the following five questions:
1. What is the scope of the Security Council's powers to prescribe,
organize, or authorize intervention?
2. Is unilateral intervention any longer permissible?
3. When should the United Nations condition intervention on a
state's consent?
4. May the Security Council authorize the "Blue Helmets" to take
"all necessary measures," including the use of force, regardless of the
purpose or type of operation?
5. Is the new superpower of the Security Council simply a bully in
multilateral disguise?
7
After Nafziger completed his research for this study in 1993, the
tragedies in Rwanda and Somalia escalated to the point where humani-
tarian intervention became inevitable.8 As a result, this update will
first evaluate whether the events in Rwanda and Somalia support Naf-
ziger's contention that reliance upon regional and international institu-
tions could have prevented these situations from threatening interna-
tional peace and security; and second, whether any of the five
unresolved humanitarian intervention questions have been answered.
II. SUMMARY OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION II
Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention traces the his-
torical roots of the self-determination principle.9 Provisions in many in-
ternational documents contain this principle, most significantly, Article
1(2) of the United Nations Charter.10 Additionally, the International
Court of Justice further developed the right of self-determination in the
Namibia and the Western Sahara cases.1 Furthermore, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' 2 and the In-
6. Humanitarian Intervention I1, supra note 2, at 233.
7. Id.
8. THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA, 1993-1996 (United Nations Dep't of Pub.
Info. ed., 1996)[hereinafter U.N. & RWANDA]; THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA, 1992-
1996 (United Nations Dep't of Pub. Info. ed., 1996)[hereinafter U.N. & SOMALIA].
9. Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 1, at 12-20.
10. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
11. Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 1, at 14. See Ad-
visory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Af-
rica in Namibia (South West Africa); Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-35 (Oct.
16).
12. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 1, G.A.
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ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' 3 expressly provide
for the right of self-determination.
Although generally accepted as a right, the scope of self-
determination remains ambiguous and consequently is subject to dif-
fering views on the meaning of the term. 14 Nafziger raises several un-
resolved questions regarding the time and to whom self-determination
is appropriate. 15  Another debated issue is the right of self-
determination for people in self-governing territories. 16 In general,
states oppose this practice, 7 but in the former Soviet Union, this right
was recently exercised through the dismantling of the USSR.18 Overall,
the principle of self-determination lacks precise guidelines for its appli-
cation.' 9 Section II provides the background on the practice of humani-
tarian intervention.20 Humanitarian intervention, as a right, remains
controversial in light of the fact that the only explicit exceptions to the
prohibition against the use of force in the U.N. Charter are in Chapter
VII or VIII, neither of which directly includes humanitarian interven-
tion.2' In addition, unilateral intervention remains extremely suspect,
but nevertheless potentially permits a prohibited use or threat of
force. 22 As a result, criteria were established to define the legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention. 23 Nafziger concludes that the criteria pro-
vide excellent guidelines, but fail to reflect actual practices.
24
Section III briefly addresses the role of the United Nations during
the Cold War and the constraints on the United Nations' ability to re-
spond to issues of self-determination and humanitarian intervention.25
Although the United Nations has been instrumental in decolonization
efforts, it has been ineffective when dealing with post-colonial situa-
tions and when serving as an instrument for humanitarian interven-
tion. 26 Nafziger contends that the bipolar stalemate limited the ability
Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
14. Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 1, at 17.
15. Id. at 17-18.
16. Id. at 19-20.
17. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to
Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 271-74 (1981).
18. Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 1, at 19.
19. Id. at 20.
20. Id. at 21-6.
21. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39, 42.
22. Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 1, at 25.
23. Id. at 25-26 (citing Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian
Brownlie and Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD 249 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
24. Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 1, at 26.
25. .Id. at 26-27.
26. Id. at 26.
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of the United Nations to effectively deal with these issues.27
Section IV focuses on the close of the Cold War and its effect upon
the ability of international institutions to handle self-determination and
humanitarian intervention issues.28 A community of power replaced
the bipolar balance of power system present during the Cold War.
29
The author argues that this community of power also contains a rejuve-
nated United Nations, capable of "facilitat[ing] self-determination, pre-
empt[ing] unilateral humanitarian intervention by states, and ini-
tiat[ing] its own form of intervention and dispute settlement."30 The
success in the Gulf War experience supports this proposition. Despite
its positive outcome, however, the United Nations was weakened by:
the failure of states to work together in good faith; the absence of clear
ground rules; and the limited bases for decision making. 31 In light of
these criticisms, the author suggests that structural changes, increased
financing, and increased action on the part of other international and
regional bodies should be implemented.
32
Section V focuses on the need for the members of the United Na-
tions to clarify the law of self-determination and humanitarian inter-
vention. 33 The author states that this is even more necessary now due
to the larger community of power present today. 34 Further, improved
mechanisms and procedures could significantly increase the efficiency
of United Nations efforts to deal with these types of problems. 35 Nafzi-
ger suggests several possible changes: first, making the Security Coun-
cil sit in session year-round; second, including the Secretary-General's
participation in Security Council initiatives and undertaking other sup-
portive activities; third, using United Nations human rights bodies to
investigate and assess these issues; fourth, establishing an interna-
tional courthouse with mandatory mediation prior to adjudication; fifth,
establishing a general instrument for the settlement of disputes; and
sixth, using regional arrangements in the settlement of disputes, coor-
dinated by the staff of the Secretary-General. 36 In essence, Nafziger
suggests shifting from a focus on unilateral action to multilateral delib-
erations and initiatives.37
Nafziger further elaborated on his first article with the publication
27. Id. at 27.
28. Id. at 27-34.
29. Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 1, at 28.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 29-32.
32. Id. at 32-34.
33. Id. at 34.
34. Id.
35. Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 1, at 35.
36. Id. at 35-38.
37. Id. at 39.
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of Humanitarian Intervention 11.38 In that article, Nafziger concluded
that the international community has finally embraced humanitarian
intervention, but several questions remained unanswered. First, what
is the scope of the Security Council's powers to prescribe, organize, or
authorize intervention? Second, is unilateral intervention permitted,
and if so, must an intervening state first exhaust international or re-
gional remedies? Third, should the United Nations condition interven-
tion on a state's consent? Fourth, may the Security Council authorize
the "Blue Helmets" to take "all necessary measures" including the use
of force, regardless of the purpose or type of operation? Fifth, is the new
Superpower Security Council simply a bully in a multilateral dis-
guise? 39
III. THE SITUATIONS IN RWANDA AND SOMALIA
A. Rwanda
In April of 1994, the on-going civil war in Rwanda resumed be-
tween the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsi (which are primarily
represented by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)).40 Just six months
earlier, representatives from each side had signed the Arusha Peace
Agreement ending the most recent conflict in a long series of conflicts
between the two tribes.4 1 On April 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda, a
Hutu, was killed in a suspicious plane crash. 42 In response, the Hutu's
immediately began systematic waves of massacres aimed at the Tutsi
and Hutu moderates resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of
people. 43 Within days, approximately 25% of the population fled or re-
located internally.
These events led the United Nations to increase involvement in
Rwanda. Several months after the parties signed the Arusha Peace
Agreement, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) was established for "peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance
and general support through the Secretary-General's good offices" in
38. Humanitarian Intervention II, supra note 2, at 219.
39. Id. at 233.
40. Keith B. Richburg, For Hutus, Life Has Become a Death Trap; Refugees in
Squalid Camps in Rwanda Fear Departure of French, Revenge by Tutsis, WASH. POST,
Aug. 12, 1994, at A29; See also S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3377th mtg. at 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (1994). [hereinafter S.C. Res. 918].
41. Peace Agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the
Rwandese Patriotic Front, signed at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, August 4,
1993; see U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1993, U.N. Doc. S/26915 (1993).
42. Keith B. Richburg & Jonathan C. Randal, First French Soldiers Arrive on Mission
to Help Rwanda, WASH. POST, June 24, 1994, at A29.
43. S.C. Res. 918, supra note 40, at 2.
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Rwanda. 44 With the civil war reignited, the United Nations took a more
active role, and in coordination with the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) and other non-governmental organizations, the U.N.
sought to provide large scale emergency relief to Rwanda.45 The United
Nations planned first, to provide for urgent survival needs in Rwanda;
and second, to rehabilitate Rwanda's devastated infrastructure as a
means of revitalizing the economy, restoring order, and promoting de-
velopment.46
By mid-May, it was clear that humanitarian relief alone would not
turn the situation around. As a result, the United Nations created
UNAMIR II, a force of 5,500 troops utilized to deter hostilities. 47 Secu-
rity Council Resolution 918 (1994) expanded the mandate of UNAMIR
into UNAMIR II.48 UNAMIR II was mandated to provide security for
refugees, displaced persons, and civilians and to ensure the distribution
of humanitarian aid.
49
Once the Security Council approved UNAMIR II, the mission faced
immediate obstacles to its deployment. The recent problems with the
intervention in Somalia resulted in a reluctance by Member States to
contribute troops and financial resources to what was viewed as an-
other African civil war.50 Further, the troops that were offered by
Member States lacked essential equipment needed for the operation.51
As a result, the international community was forced to formulate an-
other plan to assist the people of Rwanda.
The French Government, having historic ties to the region, rose to
the occasion and declared their intention to send troops into Rwanda
with assistance from the Zairian government. 52 France proposed that
this mission would operate under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, thus permitting the use of force to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security.5 3 On June 22, 1994, Security Council Resolu-
tion 929 (1994) approved the mission "Operation Turquoise." 54 Resolu-
44. Id.
45. U.N & RWANDA, supra note 8, at 69-71.
46. Id.
47. S.C. Res. 918, supra note 40, at 2.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia: Lessons from a Humanitarian Interven-
tion, CURRENT 10, May 1, 1996; Richburg & Randal, supra note 42.
51. U.N & RWANDA, supra note 8, at 50-52.
52. Richburg & Randal, supra note 42, at A29.
53. Letter from the Permanent Representative of France to the Secretary General of
the United Nations (June 20, 1994), requesting adoption of a resolution under Chapter
VII of the Charter as a legal framework for the deployment of a multinational force to
maintain a presence in Rwanda until the expanded UNAMIR is deployed. See U.N. Doc.
S/1994/734, June 21, 1994.
54. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (1994)[hereinafter
S.C. Res. 929].
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tion 929 provided that Operation Turquoise would be a temporary op-
eration, under French command, and could take "all necessary means to
achieve the humanitarian objectives of UNAMIR II."55
Operation Turquoise, though mandated by the United Nations, re-
mained a French-led multilateral operation. France retained control
over the operation and the countries supplying troops bore the costs
thereof. This is in contrast to United Nations' peace-keeping missions
in which Member States are reluctant to relinquish control over their
armed forces. 56 Nonetheless, Operation Turquoise worked closely with
UNAMIR and its officers located in Zaire and Kigali towards achieving
the goals of UNAMIR 11.57
Operation Turquoise established a humanitarian "safe zone" in
southwestern Rwanda. 58 The continuing fighting and broadcasting of
threats against the Hutus had resulted in the mass movement of
Rwandans towards the southwestern part of the country and towards
Zaire.5 9 The French troops had seen the large number of displaced per-
sons and fleeing civilians and believed that, short of a cease-fire, the es-
tablishment of a safe zone was the only way to protect the Rwandan
population. 60 On July 9, 1994, the French deployed troops to establish
the safe humanitarian zone, which, although opposed by the RPF, was
not directly challenged by them.
61
Although the war ended in July, the problems resulting from the
flight of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans continued. On July 19,
1994, the RPF declared victory and established a government of na-
tional unity.62 Just prior to this declaration of victory and cease-fire,
1.5 million people had fled into Zaire, mostly Hutus, fearing reprisal
from the Tutsi RPF.63 Despite the assurance of the new Rwandan
president that refugees in Zaire could safely return to Rwanda, 64 the
refugee camps in Zaire remained full of Rwandans, inadequately sup-
plied and ridden with disease. 65 The French Government took notice of
55. Id.
56. U.N. & RWANDA, supra note 8, at 54-55.
57. Id. at 55.
58. Aid Effort and Balladur Visit Underscore French Ties to Africa, ASSOc. PRESS,
Jul. 31, 1994, available in 1994 WL 10121428.
59. Id.
60. Letter from the Secretary-General, United Nations, to the President of the Secu-
rity-Council, United Nations (July 2, 1994) transmitting a letter from the Permanent
Representative of France to the United Nations (Julyl, 1994) concerning the establish-
ment of a safe humanitarian zone in Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/19941798, July 6, 1994.
61. U.N. & RWANDA, supra note 8, at 73-74.
62. Jonathan C. Randal & Keith B. Richburg, Rebels Declare Victory, Cease-Fire in
Rwanda, Flood of Hutu Refugees Into Zaire Continues, WASH. POST, July 19, 1994, at Al.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Keith B. Richburg, For Hutus, Life Has Become a Death Trap; Refugees in
Squalid Camps in Rwanda Fear Departure of French, Revenge by Tutsis, WASH. POST,
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the anguished situation and indicated that additional resources were
needed not only in the safe zone, but also in Zaire to support fleeing
Rwandans.
66
In order to secure the safety of those in the zone, the need to im-
plement UNAMIR II increased as the termination date of Operation
Turquoise neared. On August 10, 1994, UNAMIR II finally deployed its
troops in the safe zone and replaced the French on August 21, 1994.67
The departure of the French troops resulted in only 70,000 more Rwan-
dans fleeing from the safe zone into Zaire, a number less than ten per-
cent of the 1.2 million in the zone at that time.
68
Evidence of a planned genocide of the Tutsi minority mounted. The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) documented
the "pattern of abuses" which occurred at the hands of various militia
groups. The abuses included the torture, rape, and murder of hundreds
of thousands of people. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission for
Human Rights found that the killings had been "planned, systematic,
and atrocious," instigated by the members of the former government to
incite ethnic hatred. The Secretary-General labeled these actions as
"genocide," and, in 1994, Security Council Resolution 955 eventually
created an international tribunal for violation of international human
rights law and genocide in Rwanda.
Severe health problems continued in the refugee camps, which re-
mained filled beyond capacity. 69 As healthy, able refugees slowly re-
turned home, the weak and feeble remained, facing threats and abuse
at the hands of bandits and militia members. 70 A plan to secure the
camps was implemented through a joint effort of the Zairian govern-
ment, the UNHCR and UNAMIR II, which was ultimately extended un-
til March 8, 1995.71 Security Council Resolution 965 (1994) supported
efforts to inform the Rwandan people by radio of this joint effort to se-
cure the camps and of the humanitarian programs available to them.
7 2
Meanwhile, the Secretary-General exposed violations of the arms
Aug. 12, 1994, at A29.
66. Letter from the Office of the Permanent Mission of France to the Secretary-
General, United Nations (Aug. 4, 1994). See U.N. Doc. S/1994/933 (1994).
67. Keith B. Richburg, French Troops Withdraw from Rwanda Safe Zone; Zairian
Officials Reopen Border to Refugees, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1994, at A14.
68. Keith B. Richburg, Rwanda's Feared Wave of Refugees Turns Out to Be a Trickle,
WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1994, at A17.
69. Third report of the Secretary-General on security in the Rwandese refugee camps
(noting heightened tensions). U.N. Doc. S/1995/304 (April 14, 1995).
70. Keith B. Richburg, Refugee Camp Violence is Imperiling Rwandans; Rival Fac-
tions in Zaire Form 'a Nasty Cocktail, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1994, at A25. See also,
Keith B. Richburg, Food Aid Failing to Reach Rwandans; Malnutrition Rises as Thugs
Pilfer, Divert Camps' Supplies, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1994, at Al.
71. U.N. & RWANDA, supra note 8, at 83-84.
72. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3743d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/965 (1994).
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embargo committed by members of the former government. Reports in-
dicated that training of the former government forces was occurring in
Zaire. 73 Although noting the need for measures insuring that Rwandan
nationals did not participate in activities which would jeopardize the
Rwandan government, Security Council Resolution 1011 lifted the arms
embargo against Rwanda, 74 Apparently, the Security Council felt that,
since the embargo was initiated in order to protect civilians, a supply of
weapons would not threaten the well-being of civilians now that the
government had stabilized.
Although UNAMIR II completed its withdrawal from Rwanda on
April 19, 1996, the United Nations continued its involvement in
Rwanda. Security Council Resolution 1053 requests that the Secretary-
General maintain the Commission of Inquiry regarding the build up of
arms in Rwanda and urges all States to prevent the further develop-
ment of militia troops of the former Government of Rwanda.
75
B. Somalia
In the early 1990's tragedy struck in Somalia. Famine, civil war
and a devastated economy caused the death of at least 300,000 people.
76
The international community attempted to mitigate the problem, but
found that outsiders could only do so much without the commitment of
the various Somali factions. 77 As a result, the efforts of the United Na-
tions and its agencies, though substantial, could not rebuild this devas-
tated nation.
Civil war arose in Somalia after the United Somali Congress party
overthrew President Mohammed Siad Barre in 1990. Once the United
Somali Congress party (USC) had control, the dispute over who would
succeed Mohammed Siad Barre led to a division in the party between
two different factions. 78 General Aidid, from the Habr Gedir sub-clan,
was elected chairman by the congress, while Ali Mahdi, from the Abgal
sub-clan, was proclaimed as interim president. 79 The United Nations
sent a mediator to Mogadishu to resolve the dispute, but General Aidid
would not participate in any foreign mediation.8 0 In addition, the
problems were further exacerbated when the Somali National Move-
ment (SNM) declared an independent Somaliland Republic in northern
73. Fighting Abates in Rwanda's Capital, but Clashes Expected to Resume, Assoc.
Press, May 8, 1994, available in 1994 WL 10135801.
74. U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3566th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1011 (1995).
75. U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3656th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1053 (1996).
76. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 3.
77. Id.
78. Keith B. Richburg, Peace Effort in Somalia Meets Initial Failure; One Feuding
Side Rebuffs U.N. Mediation, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1992, at A18.
79. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 12.
80. Id.
925
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Somalia.8 ' Until independence in 1960, northern Somalia was a British
protectorate, while southern Somalia was ruled by Italy.8 2 The SNM
felt that their interests were not adequately represented causing them
to declare independence.
8 3
The civil unrest, particularly in southern Somalia (which is the
breadbasket of the country), destroyed the ability of Somalis to feed
themselves.8 4 Almost one-fifth of the entire population, 1.7 million peo-
ple, fled after the fall of the government in 1990. This mass population
movement interrupted food production, which combined with the de-
struction of farmland, irrigation systems, and livestock, set the stage for
massive food shortages in the following years.8 5 In addition, factions
and bandits, viewing food as a source of power, prevented the distribu-
tion of food by non-governmental organizations and United Nations
agencies.
86
The Security Council approved the United Nations mission in So-
malia (UNOSOM) to provide security for humanitarian providers and to
monitor the cease-fire.8 7 Additional United Nations agencies, non-
governmental organizations, and other aid providers had attempted to
continue humanitarian assistance in the war-torn country but faced in-
creasing hostilities.8 8 Although the factions agreed to a cease-fire on
February 14, 1992, absent United Nations monitoring of the cease-fire,
it did not appear that food stuffs and other essential supplies would
reach the Somali people 'due to the continued hostilities.8 9 To address
this problem, UNOSOM placed 50 military observers and 500 lightly
armed troops in Mogadishu to protect the security of relief personnel,
equipment, and supplies. 90
The United Nations, working with UNOSOM, launched a 90 Day
Plan of Action to assist the desperate Somali people in April of 1992.9 1
The civil war had resulted in the destruction of agricultural land, grain
stores, water and sanitation systems, which compounded by a drought
81. Keith B. Richburg, Fall of African Dictatorships Fuels Separatist Feeling, WASH.
POST, Mar. 25, 1992, at Al.
82. Id.
83. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 12.
84. Id. at 13.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id.
87. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. SIRES/751 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter S.C. Res. 751].
88. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 15.
89. Joint Communique issued at the conclusion of discussions between United Na-
tions officials and representatives of the League of Arab States, the Organization of Afri-
can Unity, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference with representatives of the
Somali factions in Mogadishu (Feb. 14, 1992). U.N. Press Release IHA/434 (Feb. 14,
1992).
90. S.C. Res. 751, supra note 87.
91. U.N. Doc. S/23839/Add.1, April 21, 1992.
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in northern Somalia, placed millions of lives in jeopardy. 92 The Interna-
tional Red Cross and the World Food Programme flew in 80,000 tons of
food during the first half of 1992, significantly less than the estimated
30,000 tons per month needed in Somalia.
93
As a result of increasing media coverage of the starving Somali
people, nations from around the world mobilized with food and supplies,
including the United States through Operation Provide Relief. Opera-
tion Provide Relief planned to supply 145,000 tons of food to Somalia. 94
In addition to the efforts put forth by various nations, the United Na-
tions Security Council approved an airlift to the inland areas of Soma-
lia.95 In August of 1992, the 100 Day Action Programme was estab-
lished to coordinate the efforts of various nations and agencies to
deliver food and seeds, provide health care, clean water, and distribute
materials for building shelters. 96 These efforts decreased the death rate
in some areas. The efforts were limited, however, by the continued
violence threatening relief workers and the looting of food supplies by
gangs and bandits.
International efforts to further assist the people of Somalia were
halted by the factions' opposition to these activities and suggested that
achieving the mission's objective would be difficult. In August 1992, the
Security Council increased the number of troops mandated under
UNOSOM to 3,000.97 General Aidid announced that he would respond
to the deployment of additional troops with violence. 98 On November
12, 1992, General Aidid insisted that UNOSOM troops leave the Moga-
dishu airport and fired upon the troops when they failed to depart.99
Also in early November the leader of the other faction, Ali Mahdi,
threatened to fire upon any ship trying to dock at the Mogadishu port,
believing that the supplies were aiding General Aidid.100 In south-west
Somalia militiamen who had supported the Former President Siad
Barre took over Bardera, which essentially destroyed all progress the
relief workers had previously made.10' As a result of the factional
fighting the humanitarian assistance did not reach those in need, re-
92. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 21.
93. Id. at 22.
94. Keith B. Richburg, U.S. Begins Airlift for Starving Somali, Negotiations with
Kenya Clear Way for Aid, WASH POST, Aug. 22, 1992, at A18.
95. S.C. Res. 767, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3103st mtg., U.N. Doc. S[RES1767 (1992).
96. 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia
(excerpt, Oct. 6, 1992), reprinted in U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 194. See also, Re-
port of the Secretary-General on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the
economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia, U.N. Doc. A/471553, Oct. 22, 1992.
97. S.C. Res. 775, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,775th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/775 (1992).
98. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 28.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 28-29.
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quiring a new plan by the international community.
The United Nations mandated the Unified Task Force (UNITAF)
under Chapter VII of the Charter to use force to implement the distri-
bution of humanitarian assistance under Resolution 794.102 The Secu-
rity Council authorized UNITAF to use "all necessary means" to estab-
lish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in
Somalia.10 3 The United States commanded this mission, referred to as
"Operation Restore Hope." The nations supplying additional troops
funded the mission.104 The first troops were deployed on December 9,
1992 and swiftly took control over the famine-ridden areas of Somalia,
finally implementing the objectives of the 100-Day Action Pro-
gramme. 1
05
Although the UNITAF objective was to provide food for the starving
people of Somalia, early in the mission it became clear that food distri-
bution alone was not enough.10 6 Troops discovered that unless dis-
armed, bandits and thugs would steal food intended for others, forcing
the UNITAF troops to confiscate weapons from the Somalis. 10 7 In addi-
tion, U.S. State Department officials had been facilitating "town meet-
ing" discussions between community leaders to promote discourse be-
tween opposing sides. It was hoped that such talks could lay the
foundation for future resolution of the political differences in Soma-
lia. 10S
With security ensured by the UNITAF troops, United Nations
agencies and non-governmental organizations undertook various activi-
ties in an attempt to rebuild Somalia. Efforts by UNICEF, the World
Food Programme, and the World Health Organization (WHO) focused
on providing nourishment and health care to the Somali.1 0 9 Other or-
ganizations worked to rebuild agricultural production and livestock,
through the distribution of supplies, tools, and the vaccination of the
livestock. 110 In addition to these efforts, the United Nations and other
agencies worked to reopen schools and to repair water sanitation sys-
tems. '1
The mandate of UNITAF included attempting to reconcile and con-
102. .S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/RESI794
(1992).
103. Id.
104. Keith B. Richburg, Broader U.S. Role Developing in Somalia, Americans Move
Beyond "Narrow Focus" to Take on Some Tasks of Civil Rehabilitation, WASH POST, Dec.
31, 1992, at Al6.
105. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 34-35.
106. Richburg, supra note 104.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 35.
110. Id. at 35-36.
111. Id. at 36.
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clude the conflict in Somalia. Talks were held in Addis Ababa in Janu-
ary of 1993, between leaders of the different factions. These talks re-
sulted in the Addis Ababa agreements which included among other pro-
visions a cease-fire, an agreement to disarm and hand over heavy
weaponry, and the establishment of a monitoring body to oversee these
activities."12 Nonetheless, one of the rival factions within the Somali
Patriotic Movement violated the cease-fire provision by moving troops
into Kismayo in February of that same year."
13
The Security Council mandated a United Nations led mission,
UNOSOM II, to take over upon the completion of UNITAF.1
14
UNOSOM II took over for UNITAF on May 5, 1993.115 UNOSOM II,
like UNITAF, permits the troops both to defend themselves and to use
force offensively when disarming. 116 Although the United States com-
mand ended with the completion of the UNITAF mission, over 3,000
United States troops remained in Somalia to serve under United Na-
tions command.
117
While UNITAF sought to relieve the starving and to avoid entan-
glement in the political problems of Somalia, 118 UNOSOM II intended
to participate in a broader range of activities. UNOSOM II was man-
dated to rebuild the economy, to reinstate political institutions ( in-
cluding law enforcement), and to promote national reconciliation." 19
Not surprisingly various factions opposed this outside interference,
however well intended, who viewed particular policy choices as bi-
ased. 120 Unfortunately, opposition was not only expressed through
words but also through the use of force.
Despite efforts to deter violence against the Blue Helmets, Somali
factions continued to attack. After the death of 24 Pakistani peace-
keepers in June of 1993, the Security Council approved Resolution 837
which reaffirmed that "all necessary measures" could be employed
against those who attack UNOSOM II forces. 12' UNOSOM II forces
tried to disarm the factions. This created additional fighting between
the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance faction and
112. Id. at 38.
113. Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 883 (1993)
(investigating armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel). U.N. Doc. A/1994/653 (1994).
114. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 814].
115. Keith B. Richburg, U.N. Takes Command of Troops in Somalia, WASH POST, May




119. S.C. Res. 814, supra note 114.
120. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 49.
121. S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,3229th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993).
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UNOSOM II, and caused additional civilian casualties. 122
The pursuit of General Aidid, who led the USC/SNA faction, con-
tributed to the decreasing support for the mission in Somalia. On June
17, 1993, Admiral Howe, the Special Representative for Somalia, issued
a warrant for the arrest of General Aidid because of the attacks against
UNOSOM II forces. On July 12, United States led United Nations
forces in attacking a suspected meeting place of Aidid, killing several of
his advisors. 123 The United Nations' legal department criticized the at-
tack as an "unnecessary hostility."124 These differing views on how to
handle the situation in Somalia, along with the death of United States
soldiers in October of 1993, set the stage for the departure of the United
States troops on March 26, 1994.125
After the United States and other European troops pulled out, the
United Nations mission unsuccessfully switched to a peaceful approach
in Somalia.126 In August of 1994, peacekeeping soldiers from India
were killed on several occasions. 127 In addition, efforts for national rec-
onciliation continued to fail and violence increased throughout the
country.128 Realizing that peace cannot be forced upon a nation, the
last United Nations troops left Somalia on March 3, 1994.129
IV. LESSONS FROM RWANDA AND SOMALIA
A. Can reliance upon regional and international institutions rather
than the unilateral action of individual states prevent threats to
international peace and security?
Since unilateral intervention did not occur in Rwanda or Somalia,
comparing it to intervention by regional or international bodies is im-
possible. In both situations, the United Nations authorized the use of
force to prevent a threat to international peace and security. However,
122. Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolu-
tion 837. U.N. Doc. S/26022 (1993).
123. Keith B. Richburg, U.N. Report Criticizes Military Tactics of Somalia Peace-
Keepers, WASH POST, Aug. 5, 1993, at A22.
124. Id.
125. Keith B. Richburg, U.S. Completes Pullout from Somalia, WASH POST, March 26,
1994, at Al.
126. Keith B. Richburg, Indians Girding Down for Gentler Somalia Mission, Major
Remaining U.N. Contingent Emphasizes Third World Affinity, WASH POST, Feb. 19, 1994,
at A18.
127. Statement by the President of the Security Council (concerning an attack on
United Nations peace-keepers and the killing of seven Indian soldiers near Baidoa on 22
August 1994). U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1994/46, Aug. 25, 1994.
128. Keith B. Richburg, Africa in Agony, Somalia Slips Back into Bloodshed, Anarchy,
Death Toll Grow as U.N. Mission Winds Down, WASH POST, Sept. 4, 1994, at Al.
129. U.N. & SOMALIA, supra note 8, at 77.
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the extent to which this intervention prevented the spread of violence
beyond the borders of Somalia and Rwanda, respectively, cannot be ac-
curately gauged based on these two case studies.
B. Whether the questions presented in Nafziger's second article were
answered by the events which occurred in Somalia and Rwanda?
The questions raised by Nafziger focus on the scope of the Security
Council's power and the scope of any individual nation's power regard-
ing humanitarian intervention. In both Somalia and Rwanda, the Se-
curity Council was essentially unrestricted in implementing humani-
tarian intervention, other than through the veto power of the Council's
members. States' consent may limit the discretion of the Security
Council, however, in a case where no government exists, obviously this
will not be a consideration. As a result, the Security Council is only
limited by their inability to convince its members that the reason for
humanitarian intervention meets the requirements under the United
Nations charter for the use of force.
The ability to unilaterally intervene has also not been more clearly
defined in either of these cases. As articulated in sub-section A, unilat-
eral intervention was not proposed, but in Rwanda, France did decide to
intervene prior to approval by the United Nations. This suggests that
unilateral intervention may be permitted. On the other hand, the
seemingly unilateral action of the United States in pursuing General
Aidid faced criticism from the international community. Whether dis-
approval from the international community acts as a prohibition
against the act in question depends on the policy of the acting state.
Finally, the answer to whether the Security Council qualifies as a
"bully in a multilateral disguise" will depend entirely on the individual
to whom the inquiry is directed. The dictator of a country who faces op-
position from an international offensive may argue that it is. On the
other hand, the innocent people seeking food, supplies, and security
would disagree with that characterization of the Security Council. This
question will certainly continue to be debated for many years to come.
V. CONCLUSION
The events in Rwanda and Somalia exhibit the effect that interna-
tional missions can have through humanitarian intervention. These
case studies demonstrate that despite the efforts of the international
community, without efforts on the part of the suffering nation perma-
nent change will not last. In addition, the situations in Rwanda and
Somalia teach us that simply delivering food and hastily retreating does
not cure the problem or make a nation self-sufficient. No easy answers
exist in situations where dictators use long standing tribal conflicts to
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artificially divide the country and create public contempt for one par-
ticular faction . Nafziger raises many thought-provoking issues in re-
gard to humanitarian intervention in the new community of power.
Unfortunately, the answers to these difficult questions tend to elude us.
The only certainty exists in the fact that these situations will continue
to arise, and the international community will have to struggle collec-
tively in finding acceptable and long-lasting solutions.
